The logic of the CAP: Politics or Economics? by Henning, Christian H.C.A. et al.
The logic of the CAP: Politics or
Economics?
Christian H.C.A. Henning*, Carsten Struve*
and Martina Brockmeier**
*University of Kiel; **FAL, Braunschweig
chenning@ae.uni-kiel.de
Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 77, November 2, 2008
∗ Prepared for the World Bank’s Conference on the Political Economy of Distortions to
Agricultural Incentives, Washington DC, 23-24 May 2008. We like to thank participants
of this workshop for their helpful comments.
This Working Paper series is designed to promptly disseminate the ﬁndings of work in
progress for comment before they are ﬁnalized. The views expressed are the authors’
alone and not necessarily those of the World Bank and its Executive Directors, nor the
countries they represent, nor of the institutions providing funds for this research project.The logic of the CAP: Politics or
Economics?
Christian H.C.A. Henning*, Carsten Struve*
and Martina Brockmeier**
*University of Kiel; **FAL, Braunschweig
This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorpo-
rating a model of political decision-making into a computable general eco-
nomic equilibrium model. Political decision-making among a set of legisla-
tors is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modiﬁed non-
cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron-Ferejohn type. The model
allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determin-
ing policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.
1 Introduction
Although economic theory of politics or new political economy underlines the intercon-
nection between politics and the economy for a long time (Weber, 1921; Commons, 1931;
Schneider et al., 1981; Miller, 1997), existing applied political economy models assigned
politics only a minor role and focused mainly on modeling the economic sector. For
example, most existing applied political economy studies apply classical (Stigler (1971);
Peltzman (1976); Becker (1983); Downs (1957); Hinich (1977) or more recently devel-
oped public choice models, e.g. Magee et al. (1989); Grossman (1994) to analyze policy
choices in the framework of partial or general equilibrium models.
In particular, in the ﬁeld of quantitative analysis of agricultural policy, public choice
approaches have been further developed to a very interesting range of quantitative po-
litical economy models based on partial economic equilibrium models ((Gardner, 1987;
Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Anderson, 1995; Fafchamps et al., 1993). See also the litera-
ture overview from DeGorter and Swinnen (2002)). Beyond partial equilibrium models
also very interesting approaches analyzing agricultural policy choice in a general equi-
librium framework have been developed (Anderson, 1995; Fafchamps et al., 1993).
2Since these public choice approaches assume an unitary political agent maximizing a
political support, popularity or preference function, these studies focus on the impor-
tance of economic framework conditions for the formulation of economic policy, while
political institutions are largely neglected1
In contrast more recent approaches focus on modeling the political decision-making
process as an interaction between a set of individually rational political actors. Within
these new political economy approaches, biased policies result as speciﬁc incentive prob-
lems, where political institutions are considered as key factors inﬂuencing individual
incentives of political actors. Thus, in the light of these new approaches, beyond eco-
nomic factors determining deadweight costs and demographic factors determining cost
of interest organization, political institutions are main factors in explaining observed
variances of economic policies across countries (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
For example, Persson and Tabellini or Milesi-Ferretti et al. nicely demonstrate how
the electorate system and the organization of legislature determine general macroeco-
nomic policies (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002). But, although
these new approaches nicely explain the role of political institutions in determining pol-
icy choice they focus on modeling the political sector, while a sound modeling of the
economic sector is generally not provided by these approaches. Moreover, very often an
abstract uni-dimensional policy choice set is assumed, while the simultaneous choice of
many diﬀerent policy instruments as observed for real political systems is not analyzed.
Taking particularly the case of agricultural policy, both theoretical and empirical po-
litical economy some recent studies exists taking explicitly political institutions into
account (for example, see Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Beghin et al., 1996; Olper, 2001;
Swinnen et al., 2001; Henning, 2004, 2008b; Olper and Raimondi, 2008). Most of these
studies analyze the general impact of democracy on agricultural protectionism, com-
paring agricultural protection levels in democratic and autocratic countries. Moreover,
most studies apply a heuristic approach based on quasi-reduced form estimation, while
they do not provide an explicit theory of how political institutions inﬂuence agricultural
protection 2. Finally, all of these existing new approaches focus on agricultural protec-
tion as an aggregate measure of agricultural policy outcome, while a model allowing a
quantitative prediction of a large set of various product speciﬁc agricultural policy in-
1A notable exception in this regard is Magee et al. (1989) who in their seminal work consider two
parties and two interest groups in a probabilistic voter environment, but still also Magee et al. do
not consider explicitly the role of political institutions as determinants of policy choices.
2Notable exemptions are Henning (2004, 2008b).
3struments corresponding to the policy output of real existing agricultural policy systems
has not been provided yet.
Therefore, it is still fair to conclude that no applied political economy approach ex-
ists, yet that includes a comprehensive quantitative modeling of both the economic and
the political sector. This is regretable since such approaches are especially desired by
practical politicians to identify eﬀective options for a more eﬃcient future policy design.
Nowadays it is not only commonly accepted that political institutions have a signiﬁcant
impact on policy (especially agricultural) policy outcomes (Miller, 1997; Binswanger
and Deininger, 1997) , but also international organizations such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund take governance criteria increasingly into account when
granting ﬁnancial aid.
In this regard this paper aims to contribute to closing this gap. In detail, a computable
general political economy equilibrium model (CGPE) is theoretically derived and pars
pro toto empirically applied to simulate the future European Common Agricultural Pol-
icy under diﬀerent economic and constitutional scenarios.
The CGPE model integrates an general economic equilibrium model (GTAP) with a
modiﬁed legislative bargaining model based on that of Baron and Ferejohn. Based
on a speciﬁed version of this CGPE model the impact of diﬀerent constitutional rules,
international trade agreements (WTO) as well as economic framework conditions on
speciﬁc CAP policy instruments is analyzed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 a description of the theo-
retical model is provided. In section 3 the empirical application of the CGPE to simulate
future CAP is described. In particular, the derivation of policy preferences of relevant
legislators and the empirical speciﬁcation of the legislative decision-making model is
provided in subsections 3.2 and 3.3, while subsection 3.4 described the simulated sce-
narios. Key results of the simulation analyzes are discussed in section 4, while section
5 critically discussed the potential contribution of the suggested CGPE approach and
gives a brief outlook on future research.
4Source: Henning (2000, S.118)
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a political economy equilibrium
2 The theoretical model
2.1 Background and motivation: The interplay between politics
and economics
The basic structure of the political economy equilibrium model is represented in ﬁgure
1. Political agents are interested in maximizing their level of political support. In doing
so, the political support, S, depends on the state of the economic system, z: S = S(z).
In turn, the state of the economic system depends on the policy, (α): T(z,α) = 0.
Policy preferences of the political representatives U(α) are the result of the maximization
of political support S(z) restricted by the political technology T(z,α) (Rausser and
Freebairn, 1974; Zusman, 1976).
Accordingly, political economy equilibrium models include simultaneous an economic
equilibrium model T(z,α), relating exogenous policy instruments (α) with relevant state
variables of the economic system, z, as well as a legislative decision-making model deriv-
5ing policy choice, α, endogenously from legislator’s policy preferences, u(α) and given
formal constitutional rules, e.g. α∗ = Γ[u(α)].
While T(z,α) corresponds to a economic partial or general equilibrium model, Γ[u(α)]
corresponds to a formal legislative decision-making model. Although at theoretical level
political economy equilibrium has been fully characterized, applied political economy
models existing in the literature have however not yet even come close to being able to
model both levels simultaneously.
In contrast, classical economic analysis of policy intervention focus on modeling the
impact of exogenous policy on the state of the economy using a speciﬁc functional form of
T(z,α) (Tinbergen, 1956), while in political science formal models of legislative decision-
making focus on the analysis of policy choice under various constitutional rules based
on a speciﬁc form of Γ[u(α)].
An integration of these two approaches to a general political economy equilibrium
model results when legislators’ policy preferences, u(α), entering into the legislative
decision-making model are endogenously derived from political support maximization:
u(α) = Max{S(z)|T(z, α) ≡ 0}
One of the ﬁrst formal approaches to such an integrated political economy equilibrium
model is Schneider et al. (1981). However, Schneider et al. (1981) ﬁrst assumed only one
omnipotent political agent (the government) and second used reduced forms for both
the economic model as well as the political model. More advanced CGPE’s have been
suggested by Magee et al. (1989), Fafchamps et al. (1993) as well as Anderson (1995).
Magee et al. used a two-party set-up within a probabilistic voter environment includ-
ing endogenous lobbying activities and integrate their political model with a simple two
sector general equilibrium model. However, Magee et al. used an pre-election model,
that is they assume that parties can ex ante commit to their party platform and the
platform of the winning party becomes the ﬁnal policy outcome.
Fafchamps et al. (1993) as well as Anderson (1995) integrate a political choice models
with a general economic equilibrium model. However, both approaches assumed an om-
nipotent government as a modeling framework for political decision-making. Fafchamps
et al. (1993) used an extended interest group theory of Becker, while Anderson (1995)
used a voter support function.
Hence, all of these existing advanced CGPE approaches have in common that in their
framework political institutions play no role determining ﬁnal policy choices. Fundamen-
tal pioneering work in the ﬁeld of the importance of political institutions for economic
6policy and economic development can be accredited to Douglas North, Barry Weingast
and Ken Shepsle (North, 1990; Weingast and Marshall, 1988; Shepsle, 1989). Moreover,
probabilistic voter theory (Hinich, 1977; Ledyard, 1984) provides central theoretical in-
struments for analyzing political institutions together with the development of formal
legislative decision-making models, especially the structure-induced equilibrium model
Shepsle (1979) as well as Noncooperative Legislative Bargaining model from Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) and the agenda setting model (Romer and Rosenthal, 1978) should be
named.
Following the basic logic of a general political economy equilibrium explained above in
the this section a own CGPE approach is derived, that in contrast to existing CGPE’s
allows a simultaneous analysis of the impact of economic framework conditions and
constitutional rules on policy choice.
While regarding economic modeling various applied general equilibrium models are
available in the literature, the crucial bottleneck of an applied CGPE corresponds to
the modeling of legislative decision-making. In particular, a legislative decision-making
model should be able to include multiple heterogeneous legislators and multidimensional
policy choices. These two properties are already a challenge at theoretical level, as
most formal legislative decision-making models are rather abstract including very few
legislators and assuming an uni-dimensional policy space. However, in the framework
of applied political economy modeling an additional challenges results, since the model
needs to be speciﬁed empirically.
As will be described in more detail below we suggest a speciﬁc cooperative legislative
bargaining model derived from a modiﬁed Baron-Ferejohn model of non-cooperative
legislative bargaining model, while for we use an extended GTAP-version as economic
model.
Since especially our cooperative legislative bargaining model is not standard in polit-
ical economy theory, we will derive this model in more detail in the following, while we
will only brieﬂy described our used GTAP-model as this is already fully established in
the literature.
2.2 A modiﬁed Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining model
Following Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we consider a legislature comprising of a set N of
n legislators, where l = 1,...,n denotes the index of legislator l, and a constitutionally
ﬁxed majority voting rule ϕ. Legislature has collectively to choose an policy α out of a
compact and convex subset Rm of the m-dimensional cube (0,1)m. Each legislator l ∈ N
7has a complete, transitive binary preference relation deﬁned for all α,α0 ∈ Rm, that is
represented by a concave utility function Ul(α). Formally, the rule ϕ corresponds to
a binary choice procedure, which determines legislature choice among two alternatives
α and α0, and a random recognition rule that determines which legislator can make a
proposal.
In general, the random recognition rule can be represented by a vector of individual
probabilities q = q1,..,qnL, where ql denotes the probability that legislator l is chosen to
make a proposal. For simplicity we assume in the following that ql = 1/n for all l ∈ N.
The choice procedure can be represented by a set of winning coalitions, G. A winning
coalition g ∈ G is deﬁned as an element of the superset 2N, for which the following
holds: if all members of g vote for an alternative α in comparison to an alternative α0,
then legislature chooses the alternative α.
If s denotes the status-quo policy a necessary condition for a change of the status-
quo policy is the existence of a winning coalition g whose members uniquely prefer an
alternative to the status quo SQ. Let W(SQ) ⊆ Rm denote the subset of alternatives
α, for which a winning coalition exists that prefers α to SQ. A general characteristic
of legislative decision-making is that W(s) is generally a large subset of Rm and there
exists a large number of diﬀerent winning coalitions preferring diﬀerent alternatives
to the status quo. Moreover, constitutional rules do neither determine which winning
coalition has to form nor which element of W(SQ) has to be proposed.
In this context Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model legislature’s choice of a policy α ∈ Rm
as a inﬁnite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game among legislators determined by
the following rules. At a ﬁrst stage an individual legislator l ∈ NL is selected according to
the randomized recognition rule to propose a policy and at a second stage all legislators
vote on the made proposal. If the proposed policy received suﬃcient votes, i.e. a winning
coalition forms for the proposal, this proposal is the new policy, otherwise a new legislator
is selected and the procedure starts from the beginning. Assuming individual preferences
are common knowledge Baron and Ferejohn (1989); Banks and Duggan (1998) have
shown that the non-cooperative bargaining game has a stationary subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium even for multidimensional policies and multiple legislators, i.e. m,n > 1.
Moreover, Baron (1994) pointed out that in contrast to classical political exchange
theory (see for example Buchanan and Tullock (1967); Weingast and Marshall (1988))
non-cooperative legislative bargaining theory does no more have the instability problem
of social choice theory and in contrast to political exchange theory does not require
mechanisms to enforce trades. Nevertheless, although Baron claims that their theory
8does not assume away the fundamental problems of political exchange theory, it is a
matter of fact that the nice property of sequential equilibrium crucially depends on the
assumption that individual policy preferences are common knowledge. This assumption
seems hardly realistic.3 For example, the CAP-reform decision from 1992 included all
together 67 policy dimensions in 6 regulations. Given the limited mental capacities of
human beings it is quite obvious that legislators impossibly could perfectly know spatial
preferences of all other legislators in a 67-dimensional policy space. In contrast, to deal
with imperfect information legislators simplify real world phenomena, i.e. apply low-
dimensional ideological spaces to approximate legislators true preferences. For example,
’a position in favor or against a multi-functional orientation of the CAP’ might be a
relevant ideological dimension of the CAP. Based on the ideological approximation of
the true policy space legislators are able to anticipate other legislators’ response to
policy proposals. Of course, since information is imperfect this anticipation is also only
imperfect, i.e. legislators can only estimate the probability that other legislators will
agree with their proposal.
To include imperfect knowledge of other legislators’ preferences we suggest a modiﬁed
legislative bargaining game via relaxing the assumption of noise free perfect rational
behavior of legislators (Henning et al., 2005b, 2008).
In particular, we assume that voting on a policy proposal at the second stage of the
game is probabilistic rather than deterministic, i.e. legislators do not always "best re-
spond" according to their expected utilities, since there is some noise in their choices.
This noise can be due to errors in terms of perception biases, distractions or miscalcu-
lations that lead to non-optimal decisions or it can be due to unobserved utility shocks
that make rational behavior look noisy to an outside observer. Regardless of the source
of the noise choice becomes stochastic, and the distribution of the random variables de-
termine the form of the choice probabilities. Following the interesting work of McKelvey
and Palfrey (1998, 1995) a quantal response equilibrium can be deﬁned , as a vector of
individual response probabilities that is a stochastic best response to itself (Goeree and
Holt, 2005).
3For example, Blin and Satterthwaite (1977) underline "[T]herefore, a realistic analysis of voting be-
havior must accept that a member’s true preferences are private", and Wilson (1967) even stronger
concludes that most of the legislative institutions would be superﬂuous if individual policy prefer-
ences were common knowledge. Moreover, Blin and Satterthwaite (1977) demonstrated that assum-
ing only imperfect information noncooperative legislative bargaining can lead to extremely ineﬃcient
policy outcomes.
9To simplify derivation of our model we assume for the moment that legislators’ pro-
posals are exogenously determined, that is whenever a legislator k is selected according
to the random recognition rule he will suggest his proposal xk.
To formalize the probabilistic behavior we follow Goeree and Holt (2005). Thus,
assuming probabilistic voting the total utility of legislator l received from a vote in favor
or not in favor of the proposal xk, is received by adding a stochastic utility term ξωi to
the spatial utility, where ξ > 0 is an error parameter and ωi represent identically and
independently distributed realizations of a random variable for the decision to vote for
the party platform, i = 1, or against it, i = 2. Total utility to vote for the proposal is
greater than total utility from voting against it, if it holds:
U(xk) + ξω1 > δWl + ξω2.
ξ is a parameter determining the level of agents’ rationality, the larger ξ the more
agents’ voting behavior becomes stochastic and independent of agents’ policy prefer-
ences. Assuming a double exponential distribution for ω results in the following choice
probability (Goeree and Holt, 2005):
πlk =
eξU(xk)
eξU(xk) + eξδWl (1)
Of course, legislators always vote for their own proposal, i.e.:
πkk ∀k
Further, let Wl denote the continuation value of a legislator l playing the modiﬁed
inﬁnite horizon non-cooperative legislative bargaining game, and let Πgk denote the
probability that the winning coalition g is formed to support the proposal xk, while Πk













10Given the deﬁnition above and let δ denote the common discount factor of legislators,























Finally, if we denote the vector of probabilities that legislators vote for a party proposal
k by πk = {π1k,...,πnk} and deﬁne the vector π = {π1,...πk,...,πn} , then, given the
exposition above it follows that π is deﬁned as a function of itself: π = h(π).
Accordingly, we deﬁne π∗ as a ﬁx point of h. Then π∗ can be considered as a (sta-
tionary) quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of the game as it is the best stochastic
response to itself in every bargaining period.
Sofar we have assumed that legislators proposals are exogenously given. However, in
real legislative bargaining this is obviously not the case. A contrario when formulating
a proposal legislators try to formulate a policy that guarantees the support of a winning
coalition while maximizing legislators own policy preferences.
Accordingly, deﬁne π∗(x) as the QRE implied by the proposal vector x, then the







,where x−k denotes the vector of legislators’ proposals without the proposal of legislator
k.
Thus, assuming a simple Nash equilibrium for legislators’ endogenous proposal for-
mulation an overall equilibrium for the modiﬁed non-cooperative legislative bargaining
game can be stated as in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: A vector of policy proposals, x∗, and a vector of legislators’ choice proba-
bilities, π∗, correspond to an equilibrium of the modiﬁed inﬁnite legislative session game
with endogenous proposal formulation if the following condition hold: (a) π∗ is a QRE









11Moreover, in equilibrium the expected policy outcome corresponds to a weighted mean





k, where the weight of a party k corresponds to










The proof of proposition 1 follows directly from Goeree and Holt (2005) and therefore
is omitted here.
2.3 Cooperative legislative bargaining
Note that given the noise of legislators’ choices at the voting stages as well as due to the
random recognition rule, policy outcome is uncertain ex ante. Therefore, as long as it is
assumed that legislators are risk averse, policy outcome is ineﬃcient, i.e. there always
exists certain policy outcomes which are commonly preferred by all legislators. Thus,
legislators have incentives to agree on informal decision making procedures, if these in-
formal procedures lead ex ante to more eﬃcient outcome. Weingast (1979) was one of the
the ﬁrst scholars who emphasized the role of self-enforcing informal procedures in legisla-
tive decision-making. Based on Weingast Henning (2000) suggests a mean voter decision
rule, as a self-enforcing informal procedure of legislative decision-making derived in the
shadow of the uncertain outcome of non-cooperative legislative bargaining. According to
the mean voter decision rule, legislature directly formulate a common proposal, which
corresponds to the weighted mean of legislator’s policy proposal’s, where the weights
of individual proposals equal legislators’ ex ante probabilities that their proposals will
be the ﬁnal outcome of the formal non-cooperative decision making procedure. Thus,







Given the concavity of legislators’ utility functions it follows directly that the mean
voter decision rule implies for every legislator a higher ex ante expected utility when
12compared to the non-cooperative outcome of the modiﬁed Baron-Ferejohn legislative
bargaining game.4 Hence, the mean voter decision rule is self-enforcing.5
Note, that although applying the mean voter decision rule leads to policy outcomes
that are ex ante Pareto dominant vis-a-vis the non-cooperative legislative bargaining,
a wining coalition of legislators might have an incentive to deviate from this procedure.
That is applying the mean voter decision rule is a ’legislative norm’ that only becomes
self-enforcing, if legislators do not discount future gains form cooperation too much. In
this regard we argue that in contrast to legislative decision-making in US-legislature
characterized by a large set of independent individual legislators with a relative low rate
of "political" survival, legislative decision-making in the EU-system involves a stable
set of national member states and the commission, which can be considered as corpo-
rate actors with inﬁnite time horizon. Accordingly, the shadow of the future triggers
cooperation in the EU-system, even if it might not in the US-system.
Furthermore, while the mean voter decision rule is ex ante Pareto dominant vis-a-vis
noncooperative bargaining, it is in general neither Pareto optimal nor necessarily Pareto
dominant when compared to the status quo. Accordingly, Henning (2007) elaborates
further cooperative bargaining procedures that in particulary guarantee that policy out-
comes are always ex post Pareto dominant vis-a-vis the status quo. However, since
these procedures are based on the mean voter procedure, we will focus on the mean
voter procedure in the framework of this paper to keep analyses more traceable.
Finally, as will be demonstrated in the next section another advantage of our cooper-
ative legislative bargaining model when compared to the Baron-Ferejohn model is that
it can be directly applied empirically to real political systems like the EU including
multiple heterogeneous actors and multi-dimensional policy decisions.
2.4 Derivation of a Computable General Political Economy
Equilibrium Model (CGPE)
Obviously, the ﬁnal Mean Voter decision depends on both legislators’ ex ante proba-
bilities, Ci, and legislators’ policy preferences determining legislators’ policy proposals.
Note that probabilities, Ci, depend on the set of winning coalitions which are solely
4Note that even in the original BF-model assuming perfect knowledge of legislator’ preferences policy
outcome is ex ante ineﬃcient from legislators point of view due to legislators’ uncertainty to be a
member of the winning coalition.
5In a more general version it can also be considered that the process of legislative decision making
includes always ﬁnite sessions ex post, i.e. it is possible that no proposal will be accepted and thus,
the status quo remains as the ﬁnal policy outcome (Henning, 2004).
13determined by constitutional rules of legislative decision-making. Legislators’ policy
preferences result, as already previously mentioned, from the maximization of individ-
ual political support: Ui(α) = max
α Si s.t. Ti(zi,αj) = 0.
Ti covers the economic system of the constituency which is relevant for the agent i
and Si(z) corresponds to the individual support function. Political support is deter-
mined by the state of the economic system, where the latter depends on a vector of
indicator variables, zi. The political support function reﬂects voters behavior and can
be analytically derived as additive or Nash welfare functions from corresponding pre- or
postelection probabilistic voting models (see Persson and Tabellini (2002)). These mod-
els assume that voter behavior is driven by anticipated or observed welfare gains induced
by governmental policies. However, in contrast to these existing approaches we argue in
the following that voters are confronted with a fundamental uncertainty regarding the
political technology T(z,α) and therefore use speciﬁc observable indicator variables (z)
to evaluate policy induced welfare changes. Please note that under these assumptions
political support maximization does generally not lead to Pareto-optimal policies, since
voters do not perfectly respond according to their true policy induced welfare changes.
Spatial policy preferences of individual political agents can be derived as a second















j − Yij) · (α
real
k − Yik) (6)
Yij is the individual ideal point of agent i for the policy j for which the maximal in-
dividual support, Si
opt is achieved. θi
jk is the weighting factor of the interaction term of
the deviation of the policies j and k. Based on equation 6 spatial political preferences
are derived endogenously from the political support maximization and are then incor-
porated in the legislative bargaining model. 7 On the basis of this CGPE approach
the signiﬁcance of political institutions as well as economic framework conditions can be
both theoretically and empirically analyzed.
To demonstrate this, we apply our CGPE approach to the quantitative analysis of fu-
ture European agricultural policy with due regard to diﬀerent economic and institutional
scenarios in the next section.
6Due to the fact that the optimum is approximated, the ﬁrst partial diﬀerentials are all zero and thus
the linear term β0 · (αreal
j − α
opt
j ) can be eliminated.
7Please note that similar approaches to derive endogenous policy positions exists in the literature (see,
for example, DeGorter and Rausser (1989); Fafchamps et al. (1993)). However, these approaches
do not derive complete endogenous policy preferences for individual political agents and integrate
them directly in a legislative decision-making model.
143 Empirical application of a CGPE to simulate future
CAP
As we explained in the previous section to apply our CGPE approach empirically we
need to specify three modules: (1) a economic model, (2) individual political support
functions (3) the legislative decision-making model.
3.1 Speciﬁcation of the economic model
To model the technical transformation of CAP-policies into policy concerns we needed
an economic model that is able to incorporate both ﬁrst and second pillar policies. More-
over, the model should be a general equilibrium model including relevant interaction and
spill-over eﬀects of agricultural policies to non-agricultural sectors as well as interactions
with international markets (see Fafchamps et al. (1993).
Therefore we applied an extended version of a GTAP model developed by Brockmeier
(2003). In the following we describe only brieﬂy the main structures of the model, while
a detailed description of the used GTAP model is provided by Struve (2006).
The model set-up comprises of 28 regions, of which 24 regions correspond to EU-
member states (Luxembourg and Belgium as well as Malta, Cypres and Greece were
represented by one common economic model, respectively) and separates 13 commodities
of which 8 are agricultural products. The model was calibrated using data from 2001.
However, since all simulations refer to the year 2013 projections until the year 2013
were compiled which incorporate the complete implementation of the agenda 2000, the
resolutions of the agricultural reform from 2003 and the expansion of the EU-27 and the
reform of the sugar sector as well as the agreed results of WTO negotiations. Further
the “Everything but arms”-agreement has also been incorporated.
Further, we considered the following 12 policy instruments (α). Nominal protection
rates for milk, beef, sugar and grain, as well as decoupled direct payments were con-
sidered as ﬁrst pillar polices. Moreover, we considered milk and sugar quota as speciﬁc
output restrictions as well as cross compliance and obligatory set-aside as input restric-
tions. As speciﬁc second pillar policies we considered expenditures for rural development
programs, for multi-functionality and for agricultural social and structural policy. While
price policies, quotas as well as decoupled direct payments and set-aside have already
been implemented in GTAP-model of ?, cross compliance as well as second pillar poli-
cies had to be incorporated into the GTAP model. In detail, we incorporated cross
15compliances restrictions via a shifter decreasing productivity of purchased agricultural
inputs in corresponding agricultural production functions, while expenditures under the
second pillar are incorporated as direct transfers to national farm sectors or direct pay-
ments to national households, respectively. The share of transfers paid to farms and
households, respectively, varies across speciﬁc second pillar policies, i.e. payments for
multi-functionality and structural policy payments are paid per hectare and completely
transferred to farms, while 20% of RD-payments are transferred to households. Further-
more, speciﬁc national co-ﬁnancing shares have been implemented for all expenditures
related to second pillar policies.
3.2 Speciﬁcation of support functions
Specifying individual support functions we considered seven policy concerns as relevant
indicators for the status of the economic systems (z). In detail included policy con-
cerns are standard welfare measures of socio-economic groups, i.e. welfare of farmers,
consumers, agribusiness as well as taxpayers (budgetary expenditures). Moreover, we
considered induced international trade conﬂicts, environmental protection and income
diﬀerences between rural and urban population as relevant z-variables.
While welfare measures as well as the income gap between rural and urban population
could be straightforwardly derived from our GTAP model, some of the z-variables could
only be calculated via proxies. In particular, we used the level of commercial farm
inputs as proxy for environmental protection, while we used the induced decrease of
export earnings of foreign countries as a proxy for international trade conﬂicts.
Please note in general individual policy concerns are derived form agents’ relevant con-
stituency. Accordingly, for national council members welfare measures of corresponding
national socio-economic groups as well as national environmental protection and rural-
urban income diﬀerences are derived, while for supranational agents the corresponding
concerns for the total EU are derived. Only international trade conﬂicts are considered
as a global policy concern taking the same value for all political agents.
Given the relevant agricultural policy instruments and z-variables the individual spa-
tial policy preferences Ui(α) could be in general derived from political support maxi-
mization.
16However, to do this the individual political support function Si(α) needs to be spec-








Based on the speciﬁed individual support functions and based on the speciﬁed indi-
vidual political technologies, Ti(z,α), the spatial preferences could be derived as second
order Taylor approximations as described above. Thus, relative interests in diﬀerent
policy concerns, µij, could be estimated based on the ﬁrst order condition of support
maximization given agents’ preferred policy positions. The latter were collected in per-
sonal interviews undertaken with all relevant political agents (Krause, 2005).
However, this procedure still turned out to be a rather complex computational process.
To specify individual spatial preferences we would have to derive a second order Taylor
approximation of the political support maximization for each individual political agent.
This includes an explicit derivation of second order partial derivatives of the complete
GTAP model. Moreover, in this way we would only generate a local approximation of
the GTAP model, which would not allow us to simulate the impact of changed economic
framework conditions.
Therefore, we decided to apply a diﬀerent procedure. In particular, we approximate
the original GTAP model using a set of reduced form equations, i.e. z = z(α,γ). To
specify these functions we simulated the GTAP equilibrium for randomly drawn param-
eter sets (α,γ), and calculated for each induced GTAP equilibrium the corresponding
z-variables. In this way we constructed a set of (z,α,γ) values that we could use to
estimate the reduced form functions z(α) econometrically. In detail we conducted 1000
random draws, e.g. estimations could be based on 1000 observations. In detail we esti-
mated the following quadratic form using the software R (R Development Core Team,
2005) for 25 regions and seven policy concerns z as a function of the 12 policies αj and
three general economic conditions γr. In particular, we considered a higher demand for
agricultural commodities on international markets (γ1), technical progress in the agri-
17cultural sector of new member states (γ2)and diﬀerent co-ﬁnance shares for new member
states (γ3)as γ-variables. 8:
Zi,ω = k +
12 X
j=1
(βi,ω,j · αj) +
3 X
r=1





(ηi,ω,j,r · αj · γr) (8)
The parameter β stands for linear interrelationship and η for the parameters of the
cross term.
Obviously, the function in eq. 8 is linear in policy instruments, α, where the framework
conditions are shifters of the constant term, kr
i, as well as the partial impact of policy






(βirj · αj) (9)
where kr = k +
P
r




As explained above the forenamed parameters are speciﬁc to the constituency r of
each political agent, e.g. national council members are concerned by the welfare of
social groups in their country as well as by environmental protection in their country.
However, trade conﬂicts are considered as a global variable which takes the same value
for each agent.
3.3 Speciﬁcation of the cooperative bargaining model for the EU
To apply our cooperative legislative bargaining game empirically to model CAP choices
we have ﬁrst to calculate the equilibrium of the modiﬁed Baron-Ferejohn noncooperative
legislative bargaining game (Π∗,x∗). Since an explicit calculation of this equilibrium
is tentative 9. we applied a simpler approach to approximate the equilibrium of the
modiﬁed Baron-Ferejohn game.
In particular, we calculated agents’ policy proposals, x, using the simpliﬁed support
maximization problem as speciﬁed in eq. 10. When formulating policy proposals agents
maximize their support by taking external restrictions of the parameters, e.g. due to
8A detailed description of the simulation and estimation procedure is given in Struve (2006). For all
estimation an extremely high ﬁt could be achieved, i.e. for all 2100 estimations adjusted R2-values
ranged above 0.9. However, not all estimated parameters were statistically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless
we used all estimated parameters for our simulation.
9We have derived an sequential algorithm which in general allows a approximatively calculation of this
equilibrium. But, convergence of this algorithm is not always achieved, especially for larger systems








s.t. Θ(α) ≤ κ
WTO;s.t. ψ(α) ≥ 0
Θ(α) reﬂects restrictions resulting from WTO agreements. Basically we assume that
the sum of protection rates for all four commodities (cereal, milk, beef and sugar) can
not exceed the threshold κWTO = 8. ψ(α) reﬂects the restriction that policy proposals
needs the support of a winning coalition. Technically, ψ(α) corresponds to a set of n-1
restrictions, where each restrictions reﬂects the utility gain by an individual agent form
the policy proposal of an agent i when compared to the status-quo. If agents expect
a positive gain from a suggested policy proposal, they will agree to this. ψ(α) implies
that policy proposal are supported by a winning coalition. In technical terms, due to
the large number of coalition possibilities 10 for each agent the winning coalition with
the lowest average ideological distance to the ideological position of the agent is calcu-
lated. Ideological distances between relevant political agents have been calculated based
on a factor analysis undertaken on interview data regarding preferred CAP-outcomes
(Henning et al., 2005a). Thus, only for the members of the coalition with the minimal
distance to the ideological position of the agent formulating a proposal the restriction
ψ(α) explicitly applies. The complete set of winning coalitions is calculated and mini-
mum ideological distance coalitions are determined for each agent under the consultation
and the co-decision procedures, respectively.
Overall, agents’ individual proposals, x, are inﬂuenced by both economic framework
conditions, WTO commitments and constitutional rules of legislative decision-making.
Analogous legislators’ ideal positions, y, can also be calculated based on eq. 10.
However, to derive legislators’ ideal points the restrictions ψ(α) are neglected. Thus, in-
dividual ideal points depend on WTO commitments and economic framework conditions
(γ), but not on constitutional rules.
Furthermore, the probabilities, Ci, are calculated applying a generalized voting power
index suggested by (Henning et al., 2005a). As we demonstrated in another paper
(see Henning et al. (2005a) beyond constitutional rules individual voting power indices
depend on agents policy proposals and ideological preferences. However, to simplify
10In the EU-27 there are more than 1.2 million possible winning coalitions for the consultation procedure
and about 300 million for the co-decision-procedure.
19calculation we assumed that all political agents have the same ideological preferences,
i.e. technically this implies that for all pairs of legislators i and k the probability πki
equals 0.5. Accordingly, voting power is solely determined by constitutional rules. 11
Calculated power indices are reported in table 3 in the appendix. In detail, power indices
have been calculated for the consultation procedure which is up to now the standard
procedure of CAP legislative decision-making and for the the co-decision procedure,
which according to the Treaty of Nice is foreseen to become the new legislative decision-
making procedure of the CAP12.
Finally, given agents’ policy proposals, x*, and political power, c*, ﬁnal policy outcome
results from the mean voter decision rule as indicated in eq. 5.
3.4 Simulation Scenarios
In detail we simulated CAP outcomes for the following scenarios.
Scenario 1 is the base-run scenario. It depicts politics, as expected, based upon gener-
ally accepted forecasts for the year 2013, namely forecasted world market developments,
forecasts of productivity and factor endowments in the agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors. Moreover, it is assumed in the base-run scenario that the EU includes 27 mem-
bers, while legislative decision-making still follows the consultation procedure. This
base-run scenario provides the point of reference for evaluating other scenarios.
Scenario 2 corresponds to the base-run scenario, but assumes an increasing demand
from third world countries for agricultural commodities implying an increase of agricul-
tural world market price by 5 percent.
In scenario 3 the agricultural productivity in Eastern Europe is assumed to be 5
percent higher when compared to the base-run, while in scenario 4 the level of co-
ﬁnancing of Eastern Europe is increased to the level in Western Europe, e.g. national
contributions increase from 25 to 50 percent.
In scenario 5 the reduction of protectionism by at least 20 percent in each sector
compared to the base-run is assumed to simulated further and more strict WTO com-
mitments.
11However, please note that it is generally possible to calculate voting power indices taking agents
ideological preferences into account (see Henning et al. (2005a)), and it is also possible to derive the
QRE implied by given policy proposals x∗ applying a iterative approximation procedure Henning et
al. (2008).
12An exact description of these procedures can be found in Hix (1999) and Napel (2006). The abbre-
viations are explained in table ??.
20In scenario 6 assumptions correspond completely to the one of the base-run scenario.
However, in contrast to the base-run it is assumed that the CAP is decided according
to the co-decision procedure, i.e. the European Parliament instead of the Commission
commands legislative power.
In scenario 7 we exogenously set CAP instruments to the levels observed in 2003 and
only model how this policy translates into policy concerns, z, and political support of
diﬀerent political agents under the new economic framework conditions of the year 2013.
Thus, under scenario 7 we see how policy implications look like if no further reforms
were to take place.
4 Results
4.1 CAP outcomes under diﬀerent scenarios
The detailed simulated policy outcomes resulting under the diﬀerent scenarios are re-
ported in table 1.
If we ﬁrst compare the base run scenario to the status quo scenario we can conclude
that the MTR-reform from 2003 will not be stable in the enlarged EU-27, but future
CAP reforms can be expected.
In particular, these reforms will correspond to a further shift of ﬁnancial resources
from the ﬁrst to the second pillar, where total expenditures in the second pillar raise by
2 billion Euros from 12 to 14 billion Euros (see table 1).
Within ﬁrst pillar policies a further shift from trade policies towards decoupled direct
payments will occur, where protection will be signiﬁcantly reduced by 60 percent for
grain and 45 percent for beef, while protection for milk and especially for sugar will be
only moderately reduced by 23 and 11 percent, respectively (see table 1).
Within second pillar policies ﬁnancial resources will be concentrated on rural devel-
opment programs, while both programs targeted to improve competitive agricultural
structures as well as increasing multi-functional services will be of less importance when
compared to the status quo in 2003.
Interestingly, according to the prediction of our CGPE model production constraints
in terms of milk and sugar quota as well as cross compliance and set-aside are signif-
icantly higher in the base-run scenario when compared to the status quo. Please note
that tabled values correspond to the percentage share in total production that will be cut
by applied quota, cross compliance or set-aside restrictions. Therefore, our model fore-

















































































Grain 7,15 10,51 7,30 9,32 7,16 7,82 18,33
Beef 46,48 60,40 48,66 54,91 36,17 46,82 84,53
Milk 23,55 19,35 22,60 20,04 20,77 26,48 30,64





$ Direct payments 54,62 50,36 57,98 66,83 53,83 60,67 50,70
Rural
development 13,26 14,65 10,52 7,27 11,06 11,06 12,4
Structural policy 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,89
Multi-
functionality


















compliance 14,97 15,46 15,00 14,71 14,80 14,98 5,00
Milk quota 59,81 59,99 59,92 59,93 59,78 59,82 30,00
Sugar quota 55,26 52,21 54,66 57,62 51,62 55,58 30,00
Set-aside 15,71 16,12 15,51 16,06 15,08 15,30 10,00
Source: Own calculation
casts contradict commonly expected policy developments that correspond to a complete
abolishment of the milk quota system until 2013.
How can these developments be explained?
In general explaining simulated policy developments it is useful to analyze compara-
tive statics of the political economy equilibrium. For our CGPE approach comparative
static eﬀects are rather complex taking the interplay of political and economic frame-
work conditions in the diﬀerent members states, as well as strategically interdependence
of agents in legislative bargaining into account. Analytically comparative static eﬀects
of our CGPE model can be separated into three diﬀerent components. First, legislator’s
direct political response adopting their ideal positions (y) to changed framework con-
ditions. Second legislators indirect political response adopting their proposals made in
legislative bargaining to the changed policy preferences of their coalition partners. Both
direct and indirect responses are captured in the comparative static eﬀects of legislators
22policy proposal, x. Third, the impact of changed framework conditions on legislators’
political power, c.





of our political economy equilibrium can be
derived from total diﬀerentiation of the ﬁrst order condition of the support maximization




































































































































Discrepancies in comparative statics of our model compared to existing CGPE ap-
proaches result ﬁrst from the fact that economic eﬀects of policies, that is ∂Zr/∂αi,∂2Zr/∂αi∂αj
are diﬀerent for diﬀerent economic models. Fafchamps et al. (1993) nicely demonstrated
that partial equilibrium models neglect general equilibrium eﬀects, for example the im-
pact of price policies on the domestic labor wage or world market prices. However, in
their model world market prices are exogenous, while these are endogenous in our applied
GTAP model. Moreover, in our CGPE model the relevant constituencies vary across
political agents, thus agents consider diﬀerent economies, T i, as relevant. Therefore,
policy responses of national council members to common exogenous shocks normally
diﬀer from each other as well as compared to responses of the commission or EP groups,
respectively.
13In general a subscript of a function in eq. 11 indicates the ﬁrst derivation, while a double subscript
indicates the second order derivation of this function
23Second diﬀerent comparative static eﬀects results due to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the
political support function. For example, in our model political support does not only
depend on standard economic welfare of relevant society groups, but we assume that
relevant policy concerns of voters’ include beyond monetary income also non-monetary
values such as environmental concerns, equality or international conﬂicts. As we ex-
plained in section 2 in our approach individual support maximization does generally not
lead to Pareto-optimal policies, since voters do not perfectly respond according to their
true policy induced welfare changes.
Additionally, in contrast to most of the existing CGPE ( for example Fafchamps
et al. (1993)) our approach includes legislative bargaining. Thus, our CGPE takes into
account that legislators have to form coalitions with other legislators to ﬁght their policy
proposal through. Technically, this is captured by the constraint ψ(α) which reﬂects
that legislators policy proposal also consider other legislators’ preferences. Thus, also
constitutional rules determine legislators’ policy proposals. Finally, for given policy
proposals ﬁnal policy ﬁnal outcome crucial depends on legislators political power, which
again is determined by constitutional rules.
Overall, it should have become clear from our expositions above that political re-
sponses go far beyond the simple reasoning of partial equilibrium models like the PPF
approach. Moreover, individual responses to the same changed framework conditions
might fundamentally diﬀer across agents (see also next subsection). Therefore, despite
form special cases it seems generally not possible to derive stable stylized facts regarding
comparative static eﬀects of given economic shocks. A contrary comparative statics are
rather sensitive to explicit economic and political framework conditions, captured by the
function Si and T i.
Given these general remarks, we discuss relevant factors determining observed policy
changes for the base-run when compared to the status-quo scenario.
A ﬁrst important factor is EU-enlargement. Enlargement has basically two diﬀerent
impacts. On the one hand it shifts policy preferences of old member states, since policy
impacts on relevant z-variables, e.g. budget or international trade conﬂicts, diﬀer in an
enlarged EU-27 when compared to an EU-15. On the other hand enlargement changes
the legislative bargaining game since new member states enter the game. For example,
the political trade-oﬀ of ﬁrst versus second pillar instruments changed fundamentally
from the viewpoint of the old EU-member states. This follows directly from the speciﬁc
ﬁnancial rules applied to ﬁrst and second pillar policies. In an enlarged EU protection
via ﬁrst pillar instruments is much more expensive for old rich EU-member state, as
24partly it has to ﬁnance protection in new member states, while ﬁnancial spillovers are
signiﬁcantly lower for second pillar policies due to co-ﬁnancing (for a further elaboration
of this argument see Henning (2008a)). For the same reasoning a majority of new
members states prefer ceteris paribus ﬁrst versus second pillar policies. Thus, overall
impact of EU-enlargement depends on relative political bargaining power of old and new
member states, where enlargement logically implies a signiﬁcant power outﬂow from the
old to the new member states.
A second important factor explaining policy adoption in the base-run scenario corre-
spond to the implementation of more strict WTO commitments. WTO commitments
imply further restriction of trade protections, accordingly farm support is more shifted
towards decoupled payments in the ﬁrst pillar as well as support programmes in the
second pillar.
A third factor inducing observed policy adoptions in the base run scenario are changed
economic framework conditions, i.e. increased technical progress and increased demand
of the rest of Non-EU countries for agricultural commodities inducing higher world
market prices. However, as we already explained above and as we will demonstrate in
the next subsection political responses of national council members to these changes can
be quite heterogenous.
Finally, observed development of quotas and set-aside is contra intuitive. As a matter
of fact this is partly induced by speciﬁc properties of the GTAP model. In particu-
lar, foreign and domestic supply of agricultural commodities are aggregated applying
the Armington approach, where elasticities of substitution are locally approximated to
match observed trade patterns. However, the Armington approach turns out to be a
rather restrictive modeling adjustment of trade patterns to new relations of domestic
and foreign prices. Therefore, in GTAP simulations strict quotas induce a signiﬁcant
increase of domestic prices even in the absence of high protection rates. Given the
fact that domestic and foreign agricultural commodities are almost perfect substitutes
we consider these results as an artefact. Therefore, predicted quota policies and also
predicted cross compliance and set-aside policy have to be interpreted with caution.
In general policy trends of the base run scenario can be observed for all other scenarios.
In particular, predicted developments of quota, cross compliance and set-aside policies
turn out to be remarkably stable across scenarios, which we again take as an indicator
that this is an artefact induced by speciﬁc properties of the GTAP model.
However, for scenario 2 assuming increased world market prices the reduction of pro-
tection rates is signiﬁcantly attenuated for grain, sugar and beef, while interestingly for
25milk a higher reduction of protection is predicted. Accordingly, a lower increase of direct
payments is observed, as less compensation is needed, while saved ﬁnancial resources of
the ﬁrst pillar are shifted to the second pillar for which a higher increase to over 15
billion Euros can be observed.
Please note that observed adoption of agricultural protection rates to increased world
market prices are contra intuitive applying a simple partial equilibrium framework like a
PPF approach. However, as explained above in our CGPE political economy responses
are more complex taking general equilibrium eﬀects, i.e. induced changes of domestic
wage rates or world market prices in to account. Moreover, induced changes of other
relevant z-variables are explicitly considered in our model. For example, trade protection
has a lower negative impact on international trade conﬂicts, when world market prices
are higher. Nevertheless, this contra intuitive policy response once again demonstrates
that political economy processes are far more complex than intuitive logic would predict
conﬁrming the importance of quantitative political economy equilibrium models.
Analogous to scenario 2 an increase in productivity in Eastern Europe as assumed
in scenario 3 leads also to slightly higher levels of protectionism when compared to the
base-run scenario. However, in contrast to scenario 2, for scenario 3 the expenditure
for rural development goes down, while direct payments are increased (see table 1).
Intuitively this follows if one takes into account that the ﬁrst in comparison to the
second pillar policies are c.p. politically the more attractive the higher the agricultural
productivity of a member state. Accordingly, for East European member states trade
protection becomes politically more attractive. In contrast, for old members c.p. trade
protection becomes less attractive assuming a more productive agricultural sector for
East European member states. Nevertheless, partly also Western European member
states prefer higher trade protection and less rural development spending. In our CGPE
this contra intuitive ﬁnding follows from the logic of legislative bargaining, i.e. West
member states prefer higher trade protection, because under scenario 3 pivotal Eastern
European coalition partners shift their policy preference towards trade protection.
By the same logic it also follows that the second in comparison to the ﬁrst pillar is
c.p. the more politically attractive, the lower the co-ﬁnance share of a member state.
Therefore, in Scenario 4, which simulates a higher level of co-ﬁnancing for second pillar
policies by the new member states, an about-turn from general rural development to
decoupled direct payments takes place (see table 1). In particular, for this scenario the
lowest increase of expenditures in the second pillar can be observed, which is conceivable,
since second pillar policies are less attractive for new member states assuming higher
26co-ﬁnance shares. Accordingly, farm support is more allocated via the ﬁrst pillar, i.e.
beside higher direct payments also the level of trade protection for beef and grain would
be slightly higher and for commodities restricted by quotas, i.e. milk and sugar, the
level of protectionism would be a little lower.
As expected, more restrictive WTO regulations simulated in scenario 5 imply a direct
and signiﬁcant reduction of protection rates especially for commodities with a high
status quo level of protectionism like beef, milk and especially sugar. Interestingly, the
reduction of protection enforced by WTO restrictions is only partly compensated by
higher decoupled direct payments. Moreover, expenditures for second pillar policies are
also only slightly increased when compared to the status quo.
In the case of the implementation of the co-decision procedure as assumed in scenario 6
an increased protection for milk and an increase in direct payments, with an overall
reduction in payment for rural development result. Overall, policy outcome is very
much similar to the one observed for the base-run scenario, which makes sense since
basically, the policy proposal of the commission is substituted by the policy proposals of
the EP groups. Although individual policy positions of EP groups diﬀer when compared
to positions of the commission, overall policy outcome is not very much shifted under
the co-decision scenario, since total political power of the EP groups vis-a-vis national
council members is relatively low with 15% compared to 85%(see table 3). Moreover,
opposing policy positions of EP groups partly compensate each other.
4.2 Are future CAP reforms induced by Politics or Economics?
A key question of this paper is whether CAP outcomes are more determined by politics
or economics, i.e. whether a change in political institutions or economic framework
conditions has a greater impact on CAP outcomes.
In order to be able to evaluate this question we ﬁrst have to decide what is an adequate
variable to measure policy outcomes. On the one hand we can obviously measure policy
outcomes in terms of policy instruments, α. However, neither from the viewpoint of
legislators nor from the viewpoint of society policy instruments are ﬁnal objectives by
themselves. In contrast, while legislators are interested in their ﬁnal political support,
S(z(α), society is interested in the state of the world, i.e. realization of policy concerns,
z.
27Therefore, in table 2 we present for each simulated scenario the average percentage
change of policy instruments in comparison to the base-run scenario 14. Moreover, table 2
presents the mean of the absolute values of induced percentage change of relevant policy
concerns and of induced individual support, respectively.
Table 2 shows that changed world market prices have the highest impact on both
policy outcomes (α), policy concerns (z) as well as political support in comparison to
all other scenarios. However, compared to changed world market prices a change of
legislative institutions, i.e. changing constitutional rules from the consultation to the
co-decision procedure, has only a minor impact on CAP outcomes as can be seen from
table 2. In contrast, a change of ﬁnancial rules, i.e. the increase of co-ﬁnance shares of
new member states has a signiﬁcant impact not only on policy instruments, but also on
policy concerns and individual political support of political agents, while an increased
agricultural productivity for East European member states as well as changed WTO
rules have also comparatively low impact on CAP outcomes.
Table 2: Induced changes in agricultural policies, policy concerns and legislators’ politi-
cal support under diﬀerent simulated scenarios*
Nr. Scenario Support S(z(α)) policy concerns (z) Policy (α)
2 World market prices 2,19 8,28 16,85
3 Prod.-east 0,82 1,74 13,79
4 Co-ﬁnancing 1,71 4,47 12,37
5 WTO 1,44 6,16 9,11
6 Parliament 0,67 2,45 5,40
Source: Own calculation *=calculated as mean of the absolute values of induced
percentage change of corresponding variables
Finally, to bring further evidence to our key questions whether CAP outcomes are
mainly inﬂuenced by politics or economics we calculated the euclidian distance between








The total distances dk as well as distances calculated separately for ﬁrst and second
pillar policies as well as production constraints are represented in ﬁgure 2.
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As can be seen from ﬁgure 2 by far the largest impact on CAP resulted from the
EU enlargement as the largest euclidian distance is observed for the status quo in com-
parison to the base run scenario. Moreover, protection is most inﬂuenced by WTO
commitments followed by increased world market prices, while in quantitative terms
changed constitutional rules have only little impact on future agricultural protection.
However, regarding second pillar policies a signiﬁcant impact of changed constitutional
rules can be observed. Moreover, changed ﬁnancial rules have a signiﬁcant impact on
second pillar policies (see ﬁgure 2).
5 General versus partial political economy equilibrium
modeling: Is it worse the eﬀort?
Overall, simulated CAP outcomes for diﬀerent scenarios on the basis of a speciﬁed CGPE
provides an insight into the mechanics of CAP decision-making.
However, it deﬁnitely has become clear that application of CGPE is a rather complex
process. Depending on the concrete decision-making procedure up to 35 relevant political
agents decide on 12 policy instruments, which result in a total of 2,500 policy positions
which are adapted under various scenarios.
Thus, the question that arises is: "Is this extremely high additional eﬀort of CGPE
modeling justiﬁed when compared to simple partial equilibrium models like for example
a PPF approach.
In this regard a critical observer could argue that adaption of policy position to
changed economic framework conditions basically follow the same stylized facts for all
individual political agents and accordingly the ﬁnal outcome of legislative bargaining
will also adopt in the same direction. Thus, one might argue while the understand-
ing and modeling of complex legislative bargaining processes have certainly a scientiﬁc
value on its own, in the framework of applied political economy modeling it is not worth
the eﬀort, since in essence the systematic shift in legislative outcome can be derived
from individual support maximization independently of complex legislative bargaining
procedures.
Given the fact that it is always possible to approximate locally any policy output
with a simple PPF approach neglecting legislative bargaining assuming an omnipotent
unitary political agents, the crucial question is to what extend these simple political
29economy models are able to mimic comparative statics of a more complex political
economy equilibrium.
In this regard it might be instructive to analyze how individual policy positions of
involved individual political agents change across scenarios. 15.
To this end we report pars pro toto individual adoption rates of decoupled payments
for 27 national council members and the commission in ﬁgure 3.
insert ﬁgure 3
Without going into further details it can be clearly seen from these ﬁgures that,
although some scenario speciﬁc adoption patterns can be observed, adaption of policy
proposal is rather heterogenous between agents.
Finally, to test relevant contribution of CGPE even stronger we compare our CGPE
results to policy predictions derived from a general equilibrium PPF approach. The
latter derives policy outcome from support maximization of the European Commission
under the restriction of the reduced from of the general equilibrium model (GTAP).
Thus, the only diﬀerence between the general equilibrium PPF approach and the
CGPE is that the former neglects legislative bargaining assuming the commission is the
omnipotent ruler of the CAP. As a matter of fact a similar approach has been suggested
by Francois et al. (2008).
Figure 4 reports the equilibrium outcomes for all 12 policy instruments for scenario
1-5. 16
insert ﬁgure 4
Since the scale of predicted policy instruments partly diﬀers extremely we used a
logarithmic transformation of original policy instruments (ln(1 + α) to allow a better
graphical presentation of the results.
Overall, ﬁgure clearly demonstrate that PPF approach delivers signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
results for all scenarios, where policy outcomes not only diﬀer for the same scenario,
but partly predicted adaption of policies to changed framework condition also diﬀer
extremely in quantitative terms. This holds especially true for rural development policy
15Please note that individual ideal points (Y) as well as individual policy proposals (x) vary extremely
across political agents (see Struve (2006). However, given our expositions above here we focus on
comparative statics of these positions
16Of course, for scenario 6 the PPF approach predicts exactly the same outcome as for scenario 1.
30programmes, where the PPF approach not only predicts 23 times higher payments when
compared to the CGPE, but also fundamentally diﬀerent adaption for scenario 3 and
4, i.e. while the PPF predicts a signiﬁcant increase of RD expenditure by a factor of
roughly 2.6, the CGPE predicts of a decrease by a factor of -0.72 and -1.52 for scenario
3 and 4, respectively.
Thus, overall it is fair to conclude that taking legislative bargaining explicit into
account not only allows a quantitative prediction of how policy outcome change under
diﬀerent political institutions, but also deliver fundamentally diﬀerent policy predictions
for given political institutions.
Therefore, CGPE’s provide important contributions not only at theoretical level, but
also for applied political economy analysis.
Nevertheless, we have to admit that our applied CGPE approach is only a ﬁrst step
towards a comprehensive applied political economy modeling. In particular, in future
research the cooperative legislative bargaining model can be further elaborated to even
better reﬂect bargaining procedures applied in political practice. Moreover, the reduced
form modeling of the general equilibrium model could be improved, e.g. estimating a
generalized quadratic form instead of a simple linear form. Analogously, the equilibrium
of the modiﬁed Baron-Ferejohn game could be better approximated in future applica-
tions. One the one hand for given policy proposals the corresponding QRE could be
calculated and one the other hand individual policy proposals could be derived as true
Nash strategies. Furthermore, it would be interesting to test prediction power of CGPE
approach empirically, that is to compare CGPE predictions with real empirical policy
decisions, e.g. comparing base run predictions with real CAP reforms decided in 2013.
Finally, future research could also focus on the interesting question to what extend real
world politicians are able to understand the complex interplay of economic and political
framework conditions. Thus, it might be conceivable that politicians reduce real world
complexity via applying much more simpliﬁed heuristics and rules of thumb. Techni-
cally, this implies that support maximization is based on much less complex economic
and political models than assumed in our CGPE approach. For example, in this regard
political ideology can be understood as political belief regarding a much more simpli-
ﬁed transformation of speciﬁc policy instruments into political support. We consider
incorporation of ’political beliefs’ or ’political ideology’ into formal political economy
modeling also as a very interesting topic for future research.
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DE 7,0 6,5 PL 6,7 6,2 kom 9,3
UK 7,0 6,5 RU 3,9 3,6 EVP 5,2
FR 7,0 6,5 CR 3,4 3,1 PSE 3,5
IT 7,0 6,5 HU 3,4 3,1 ALDE 3,3
ES 6,7 6,2 BU 2,8 2,6 Verts 0,8
NL 3,6 3,4 SR 2,0 1,9 GUENGL 0,8
HE 3,4 3,1 LI 2,0 1,9 INDDEM 0,5
BE 3,4 3,1 LE 1,1 1,1 UEN 0,5
PT 3,4 3,1 SL 1,1 1,1 IN 0,8
SW 2,8 2,6 ET 1,1 1,1
AU 2,8 2,6 CY 1,1 1,1










Source: Henning et al. (2005a)
Members of the EU-15 command 60% of the power, the new members around 30%
and at the level of the institutions of the EU, supranational agents, i.e. the Commission
and the EP, command together 10% of the power for the consultation and 15% for
co-decision procedure.
37Source: Own Calculation
Figure 2: Impact of political and economic factors on CAP policy outcomes: Euclidian
Distance to base-run
38Source: Own Calculation
Figure 3: Adoption of policy proposals preferred by the commission and national council
members in diﬀerent scenarios: Decoupled payments measured as diﬀerence
to base run scenario
39Source: Own Calculation
Figure 4: Adoption of policy proposals predicted by a CGPE and a PPF approach for
scenario 1-5
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